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1. Introduction 
 
In this undergraduate thesis, I will be presenting a literacy review about the Prospect theory. A theory that 
forever changed the way economical decision-making under risk is evaluated and theorized. Prospect theory 
was first presented to the world in 1979 by Daniel Kahneman (Nobel price winner 2002) and Amos Tversky 
(who would have shared the Nobel price if he wouldn’t have died in 1996) both of whom were primarily 
psychologist. At first, prospect theory was truly controversial, mainly because economists commonly shared 
the framework of expected utility theory – which is, even till this day, taught in economics 101 courses – in 
which the decision-making in situations under risk is regarded as a rational process. This rational process took 
individual preferences in risk-seeking into account. However, the prospect theory found irrationals (anomalies) 
in human behaviour and these findings questioned the underlying axioms presumed in the preceding theory, 
e.g., the expected utility theory. 
Prospect theory challenged the previous theoretical framework by presenting a strong claim with 
empirical evidence, among other things, that the thought process by which individuals make decisions under 
risk is not rational, at least in the traditional sense. They presented empirical evidence in which by merely 
changing the way the problem was formulated, people made completely different choices. This finding 
shocked the academic world, which mainly tried to explain the anomalies by denying the results of this paper, 
by questioning the methods by which the findings were discovered. Many of the phenomena presented by the 
prospect theory actually do stem from the relevant psychological literature. To demonstrate this, e.g., the value 
function presented in the theory reflects “three basic facts: organisms habituate to steady states, the marginal 
response to changes is diminishing, and pain is more urgent than pleasure.” (Tversky and Kahneman 
(1990:1057)) This multidimensionality was probably one of the most eminent reasons for why the theory 
received its fair share of criticism. 
Even though the framework presented by Kahneman and Tversky was profound, some of its findings 
were commonly noted by the public long before this paper was published. In an evergreen classic novel, Notes 
from the underground (1864) by Fyodor Dostoyevsky, the main character “underground-man” famously noted: 
“Man only likes to count his troubles; he doesn’t calculate his happiness.” For what this is worth, it could be, 
therefore, argued that the underlying brilliance presented by the prospect theory has been long recognized in 
the public. This helps to explain why the theory seems to be intuitively somewhat easy to follow.  
During this undergraduate thesis, we will first dive into the paper in which the prospect theory was 
published in 1979. Secondly, I attempt to shine a light into the critic's prospect theory has received throughout 
the years it has existed. Thirdly, I will try to evaluate how the critic’ has changed the framework published in 
1979. On top of that, I will showcase how Kahneman and Thaler completed the first version of Prospect theory 
in 1990 and how these changes have shaped the formulation of the theoretical inputs of the theorem. To 
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emphasize the adaptivity of the theory I will showcase real-life evidence about the decisions made under risk 
and how the prospect theory helps us to analyse the occurring phenomena. Lastly, I will try to contemplate the 
question of why the prospect theory was revolutionary and what might be the future implications and 
applications for the theory. 
 
1.1. The fundamental axioms of Prospect theory: 
 
First off, prospect theory is a theory which offers a framework to understand and explain individuals choice 
processes under situations involving risk. This framework is mainly descriptive and therefore its aim is not to 
give any accurate figures or multipliers but rather to understand and describe the underlying narrative regarding 
the decision maker’s thought process under risk. Prospect theory showcased two revolutionary findings: the 
first one was that “people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that 
are obtained with certainty” [Kahneman and Tversky 1979]. Before the presentation of this theory, expected 
utility theory had assumed that individuals probability weighting was in line with the mathematical equivalent 
counterpart. Therefore, the assumption that people are in fact weighting probabilities with inconsistency, was 
controversial, to say the least. 
The second finding of Kahneman’s and Tversky's empirical evidence had to do with the fact that 
people tend to emphasize the monetary downsides (losses) greater than in comparison with similar monetary 
upsides (gains). The mechanism by which this difference takes place will be explained in more detail later on 
this thesis. This second finding was truly controversial as well. Before this infamous article, expected utility 
theory assumed that the valuation of both gains and losses were emphasized with the same amount of weight 
because rational decision maker would realize that the only difference between the two is the sign in front of 
the number. 
In the initial publication, [1979] Kahneman and Tversky defined the choice process under risk into two 
different phases: the first one has to do with the initial scanning and sorting of the problem ahead, namely the 
editing phase. The second phase has to do with the data processing of the sorted data, namely the evaluation 
phase. Both of these phases do not occur simultaneously and therefore they are taking place at different times. 
Let’s now examine and define these phases with more depth. 
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2. Editing phase: 
 
The main purpose of the editing phase is to make a preliminary analysis of the prospects1. This way, in the 
editing phase, a decision maker simplifies alternatives or possible outcomes for the evaluation phase. In order 
to make a preferable actual choice. Kahneman and Tversky [1979] suggest that the editing phase can be 
diversified for several different processes, all of which takes place simultaneously. With the framework about 
these different processes, they try to explain many of the occurring anomalies in preference and this way 
broaden our understanding about the choice process under risk. The theory about these different processes is 
supported by empirical evidence. Based on this empirical evidence, they propose that the editing phase consists 
of six different types of editing processes, namely: Coding, Combination, Segregation, Cancellation, 
Simplification and The detection of dominance. Below, we shall examine all of these editing processes in 
more detail. 
 
2.1 Coding: 
 
Coding can be seen as the most influential part of the editing phase, in which, Kahneman and Tversky are 
describing an empirical finding, from their surveys, that people tend to reform the possible outcomes, e.g., 
monetary sums of money, to more easily approachable concepts: gains and losses. This notion can not be 
complited by itself. For gains and losses to existing, they must, obviously, be defined in relation to some neutral 
reference point. Kahneman and Tversky argue, that the reference point is usually in correspondence to the 
current assets position, in which the actual amounts are received or paid. In other words, for a millionaire, a 
raise of 500 euros does have a completely different meaning than it would have to an average wage earner. 
However, the level of the reference point is not this one-dimensional. The actual location of the reference 
point, and this way the coding to gains and losses, can be affected (manipulated) with the simple act of 
formulating the proposed prospects differently or by influencing the expectation of the decision maker. 
 To demonstrate this, imagine the following scenario. On a normal morning journey to the university, 
our imaginative person would find a 5€ bill lying in the ground. After picking up the bill, this finding would 
probably lighten up the mood of this person, he/she might even tell about this unexpected event to their friends, 
during lunch. Despite this, this wonderful feeling of finding extra cash would probably fade away rather 
promptly since 5 euros is just not that significant monetary sum, in comparison of average person possessions. 
In the next scenario, imagine this same morning journey to the university. But this time, our 
imaginative person would, instead of finding, lose a 5€ bill in the morning rush. When this loss is actually 
 
1 Uncertain alternative choice options 
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realized, the feeling of sadness is strong. During lunch time, our imaginative person would probably tell about 
this inconvenient accident to his/her friends with a detailed analysis of how this might have occurred. Later in 
the evening, the feeling of a loss, would probably still haunt our imaginative person, even though the 5 euros 
lost, is yet again, an insignificant amount of money to our person. One might even argue, that any reasonable 
person would not take this insignificant loss onto one’s heart this strongly. Somehow, we all can identify with 
the latter situation. This example demonstrates, how the monetary sum of 5 euros, can be coded into gains or 
losses and furthermore how this coding might de facto affect the decision maker’s feelings more than could be 
seen reasonable. 
 
2.2 Combination: 
 
The empirical studies seem to outline a possibility for the decision maker to simplify prospects by combining 
the probabilities associated with identical outcomes. Kahneman and Tversky found the following anomaly 
during the numerous surveys they compiled. When faced with two prospects, for example, Choice A (100€ 
gain with the probability of 20 %) and then with Choice B (100€ gain with the probability of 20 %). Both of 
these choices are taking place in timely different phases. Because of this, people often seemed to reduce this 
decision by combining alternatives A and B to a choice C (100€ gain with the probability of 40%) and 
evaluated their decision in this form. This is, yet again, a violation of what the expected utility theory is 
presenting. 
 
2.3 Segregation: 
 
In some scenarios, prospects can be divided, in the editing phase, into risky and riskyless components. For 
example, a choice between choice D (200€ gain with a probability of 90%) and choice E (100€ gain with a 
probability of 10%) can be seen as a choice between a sure gain of 100€ and a 90% chance for extra 100€. 
This way of dividing the prospect is another form of simplifying.  
Coding, combination and segregation are applied to each prospect separately. Where as a cancellation, 
simplification and the detection of dominance can be applied to prospects as a set two of more prospects. 
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2.4 Cancellation: 
 
Kahneman and Tversky proposed that people can isolate different parts from multiple prospect choices. For 
example, if people are told that in the first phase they get 100€ on top of the wealth level already they have 
and after that, they will have to choose between prospects A (100€ with a probability of 50%) and B (50€). 
People would discard the first set of information because it’s similar for both possible outcomes. Therefore, 
people would naturally imagine the situation as a choice between prospects A and B. In this situation, the 
majority chose option B, the sure 50€. At least, according to the findings of Kahneman and Tversky. If we 
now take a closer look, this decision is actually a choice between A (100€ with the probability of 50% and 
200€ with the probability of 50%) and B (150€). In this way, the whole act of choice is biased. In essence, a 
cancellation can be defined as an act, in which, decision maker discards similar information common for both 
prospects. 
This anomaly can produce truly contradictory results. Let’s demonstrate how these truly controversial 
outcomes can be acquired. If we now imagine another set of prospects, where decision maker will surely get 
200€ on top of the wealth level they already pose. After this, the decision makers will have to choose between 
prospects A (-100€ with a probability of 50%) and B (-50€). In this situation, decision makers are likely to 
discard the information common for both prospects. From there, the situation is simplified to a choice between 
A and B. According to Kahneman’s empirical experiments, decision makers do, in this situation, opt to go for 
the prospect A. Now, if we take a closer look, this decision situation is actually identical with the previous one. 
If we would not discard the first phase, in which, we acquired 200€ on top of our current wealth level, the 
decision would be made between A (100€ with the probability of 50% and 200€ with the probability of 50%) 
and B (150€). With this example, we can clearly identify the biased behaviour axiom, in other words, 
cancellation. 
 
2.5 Simplification: 
Kahneman and Tversky [1979] showcase two different types of simplification. The first one is concerned with 
rounding up or down possibilities. They illustrate this phenomenon with an example. When a decision maker 
is faced with a prospect E (101€ with the probability of 49%) they are likely to regard this decision situation 
as an even chance to win 100€. Even though with a simple calculus we can derive that the option after this 
simplification process is surely not the same as the prospect E. This rounding up or down effect, could be 
interpreted as a rule of thumb2, where decision makers do acknowledge that their way of editing the prospect 
is, in fact, wrong. But its close enough, not to cause any further action to solve this inconsistency. This was, 
 
2 A broadly accurate guide or principle, based on practice rather than theory. 
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one of the remarkable notions presented by Richard Thaler, who’s ideas influenced the field of behavioural 
economics (finance) and especially the of prospect theory. During this thesis, we will take a closer look into 
the finding presented by Thaler.  
The second form of simplification has to do with the fact that decision makers tend to discard 
extremely unlikely outcomes. To illustrate this, lets visit another example. In this example, a decision maker 
faces a prospect F (100€ with the probability of 0,01%). The decision maker is likely to round this extremely 
unlikely outcome to 0 (never going to happened). This was a finding from the surveys Kahneman and Tversky 
put forward. This rounding phenomenon can be seen in the case of extremely likely outcomes, as well, where 
the rounding up goes, logically, to 1 (fully certain). This bias called simplification has been noticed for a long 
time, and therefore, is widely exploited by many. For example, insurance business does take this into account, 
to name one. On top of this, it is important to notice that individuals do vastly differ in their preferences. For 
this reason, their reaction regarding biases can vary significantly. These experiments are, therefore, trying to 
figure out the biases occurring around the mean, rather than to specifically focus onto individuals. 
. 
2.6 Detection of dominance: 
 
The final process of the evaluation phase revolves around the detection of dominance. Detection of dominance 
can basically be defined as a scanning process, in which, the prospects are scanned through. And if a decision 
maker detects a prospect that is dominated (absolutely worse than alternatives), then this prospect will be 
automatically discarded from the future evaluation. 
 
 
3. Evaluation phase: 
 
After the editing phase, the decision maker evaluates each of the edited prospects according to their assigned 
value3 and then chooses the prospect of the highest value. The overall value of an edited prospect was presented 
(in mathematical calculus) as a denoted V. This denoted V, is expressed in terms of two scales, weighting 
function (π) and the value function (v). Both of which, had their own set of axioms and ground-breaking 
insights. Let’s now concentrate on the meaning, mathematical formulation and interaction of the weighting 
function(π) and the value function (v), in other words, the evaluation phase. 
 
3 Assigned value will be determined during the evaluation phase. 
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3.1 The Value Function 
 
The value function is an inherent part of prospect theory because it tries to take into account several rather 
controversial facts. Firstly, people seem to put a larger amount of value to losses than for equal amounts of 
gains. Secondly, people seem to evaluate the value of a prospect in terms of difference and change, rather than 
in the absolute numerical difference between the starting point and the final state. In addition, Kahneman 
argues, that the relative magnitude of change from the reference point does have a greater significance that the 
absolute change in the examined prospect. These assumptions are coherent and in fact greatly influenced by 
similar findings done in the field of psychology [Nelson 1964). Kahneman and Tversky do point out, that 
decision makers tend to react in response to a point, that the past and present context have defined, namely the 
reference point. For this reason, the magnitude of change from the reference point does matter in the evaluation 
of the prospect. To shine more light into these psychological findings, let’s demonstrate this with examples. 
Imagine placing a hand into a bucket (A), full of ice (reference point), for ten seconds. Then to switch 
this hand to another bucket (B), with 20 Celsius water in it. After this switch, the water in a bucket (B) feels 
warm and calming. Now, in the second scenario, the second basket (B) stays the same but the first basket 
(reference point) is changed to basket (C), that has 40 Celsius water in it. In this second scenario, when one’s 
hand is moved from the basket (C) to the second basket (B), the water probably feels cold or at least mild, even 
though the water in the second basket (B) remains the same. This principle of reference point dependence 
behaviour affects human behaviour also with other attributes such as wealth and prestige, Kahneman and 
Tversky argue. 
To illustrate the relevance of the magnitude of change, from the reference point, let’s take a look into 
another situation with baskets. In this situation, the first basket remains the same basket A (with ice-cold water 
in it). Now, to spice things up, the temperature of the water, in the first basket, is changed from the temperature 
of 0 Celsius to 6 Celsius. This change in the water temperature can probably be noticed with ease. To 
demonstrate the relevance of the magnitude of change from the reference point. In another situation, we would 
change the water temperature in the basket B (20 Celsius), to 26 Celsius. This difference can surely by noted 
but the felt difference in regard to the reference point (20 Celsius), would not be felt as significantly, compared 
to the change in the first example, when the temperature was changed from 0 Celsius to 6 Celsius.  
Thus, as we have demonstrated with these examples above, Kahneman argues, we can assume that the 
function for gains (losses) is concave (convex), since it faces diminishing value from a gain (loss) increase. 
This phenomenon has later been named as diminishing sensitivity (Barberis 2013). 
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3.1.1 Visual representation of the value function 
       
Figure 3 represents the description of the potential form of the 
value function. However, the main emphasis is not to precisely 
map out the exact magnitudes of change but rather to offer a 
visual description of the function. However, as we can see from 
the figure, Kahneman and Tversky defined the reference point 
to be located in the origo. The function for the gains is defined 
to be concave and for losses, it’s defined to be convex, the reason 
for which we established the explanation for earlier. The 
convexity for losses seems to be steeper, than the similar 
magnitude of concavity for the gains. To demonstrate this more clearly, let’s go through another example.  
 In the original article, Kahneman [1979] proposed two problems for his students: Problem 1, Choose 
Options A [Gain of 6000 with the probability of 25%] or Option B [Gain of 4000 with the probability of 25% 
and Gain 2000 with the probability of 25%]. In this experiment, 82% chose the latter. Then Kahneman 
proposed another problem. Problem 2, choose between Option C [Loss 6000 with a probability of 25%] and 
Option D [Loss 4000 with a probability of 25% and Loss 2000 with a probability of 25%]. In problem 2, people 
chose option C with a majority of 70%. Even though the only difference between these two dilemmas is the 
sign in front of the proposed values, the difference in the answers is significantly different. One interesting 
behavioural element in this experiment, that Kahneman [1979] concluded, is that when the sign, in front of the 
sum of money, is positive. In other words, when decision makers face probabilistic chances to pursue gains 
they tend to be risk aversive4. On the other hand, when decision makers are faced with probabilistic chance to 
lose, e.g., money, they tend to be risk seekers5. This phenomenon, was the foundation behind the steeper 
convex function, later named loss aversion (Tversky 1991).  
This finding was in contradiction with the utility theorem because in the expected utility theorem, the 
convexity (concavity) of the gain (loss) side, was recognized but they were, logically, both presented to be 
functions of the exactly same shape and size. Because of this contradiction, with the expected utility theorem, 
these findings were later on examined intensely. The results of these repeated experiments yielded, however, 
the same results that Kahneman and Tversky had already presented in their original paper in 1979. 
 
4 Is defined as a behaviour acted out by the decision makers, where, when exposed to uncertainty, decision makers 
attempt to lower this uncertainty. To put it differently, in these situations, decision makers are even willing to pay in 
order to reduce the uncertainty. 
5 Is defined as a behaviour, acted out by the decision makers, where, when exposed to uncertainty, decision makers 
are in fact, ready to pay for the increase of uncertainty. 
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3.2The Weighting Function: 
 
The weighting function was also in contradiction with the expected utility theorems axioms since it supposed 
that if decision makers are shown the exact probability for an event to occur, they would evaluate their options 
in regard to this exact, mathematically sound, probability. In prospect theory, however, Kahneman argues, that 
decision makers do not actually evaluate these probabilities exactly in the same way, that would be 
mathematically correct. In fact, decision makers seem to weight these mathematical probabilities with an 
individual weight. In other words, Kahneman states, that decision makers do, on average, in fact, weight, e.g., 
truly small probabilities with significantly higher multipliers than would be mathematically correct. This 
contradiction is also true for truly high probabilities, the decision makers tend to evaluate these probabilities, 
with significantly smaller multipliers than would be mathematically reasonable. In essence, this is what 
Kahneman means with the weighting of probabilities. 
In the weighting function, the mathematical probability for the event to occur and the value attached 
to it about each outcome is multiplied by a decision weight. These decision weights are not probabilities and 
they should not be interpreted as measures of degree or belief. Rather, “the decision weights represent the 
impact of events on the desirability of prospects and not merely the perceived likelihood of these events.” In 
more technical terms, the weighting function follows the formulation of π (p) = x. The (p) here presents the 
probability for the event to occur. The weighting function is bounded by limitations π (0) = 0 and π (1) = 1. 
The assumption being, that impossible outcome is ignored, and certain events are belived to be certain. On top 
of this, it is assumed that π is an increasing function of p. If π (p) = p, then the expected likelihood principle6 
holds. In other scenarios, however, this is not the case. Kahneman points out, that the decision maker’s decision 
weight can be altered by many distractions, e.g., by ambiguity. This feature of the weighting function will be 
discussed in more detail, later on in this thesis. 
 It is important to distinguish the weighting of certain probabilities from overestimation, which is 
usually the case with the estimation of rare events, such as plane crashes, in which, some decision makers do 
over-exagerate the probability for this tragical event to take place. This phenomenon can also occur by 
underestimating the probability for something to happen. E.g., when a decision maker is driving a car it might 
underestimate the probability for it to get into a car crash. In the prospect theory, it is explicitly assumed that 
people adopt the given probability (value of p). Kahneman states, that in-real-life both, overestimation and 
weighting are likely to take place.  
 
 
6 The probability weighting equals the actual mathematical probability. 
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3.2.1 The shape of the weighting function 
 
In figure 4, is the early expression of the weighting function, the 
hypothetical weighting function can be found in the picture as a slightly 
curving line. The diagonal line, in figure 4, is the expected utility 
theorems “weighting” function. This demonstrates to us, what was the 
revolutionary element about the weighting function, in prospect theory, 
represented here. In the figure, “the slope of π in the interval, can be 
viewed as a measure of the sensitivity of preferences to changes in 
probability”, Kahneman argues. He goes on stating, that since the 
simplifications in the editing phase may discard extremely likely or 
unlikely outcomes, the weighting function is not “well-behaved” near 
the end-points (0,1). With this, he means that the function would take a sudden turn towards 0 (never 
happening) and 1 (certain event), in the most extreme cases and this would make the function more confusing, 
and therefore this element is not illustrated in this figure 4. It is interesting to point out, that decision makers 
seem to have a truly limited understanding of probabilities. 
 During Robert Shiller’s (Nobelist as well) lecture, about the prospect theory, he even comically 
argues, that it seems like decision makers brains have not yet adapted to this mathematically demanding form 
of reasoning, called probabilistic thinking. He goes even further, stating, that it seems like decision makers 
have a three-step-model for understanding probabilities. These are not possible, maybe and certain. This is, of 
course truly simplistic, and made with a good sense of humor, but does capture something truly relevant and 
magnificent about the prospect theory’s way of contextualizing the probabilistic thinking process. 
Let’s now examine these both extreme ends of the weighting function. Kahneman simulated these 
situations, by asking the following guestions: Firstly, decision makers were asked to choose between the choice 
E (3000€ with the probability of 0,1%) or choice F (3€). The overwhelming majority (72%), in this experiment, 
chose the option E. In other words, they were willing to pay 3€ for a lottery ticket that had expected the value 
of 3€, which is rather odd, since usually this interaction involves transaction and waiting for costs. When the 
situation was turned on its head, and the decision makers had to choose between a choice G (-3000€ with the 
probability of 0,1%) and choice H (-3€) the even more significant majority (83%), chose the latter. Even 
though, yet again, the only difference between these decisions was the sign before the monetary sum of money. 
From this experiment, Kahneman concluded that decision makers are, on average, willing to pay for a 
lottery ticket (a possibility for huge gains) and for an insurance (avoidance of huge losses). Kahneman goes 
on stating, that even though, prospect theory predicts both of these phenomena (lottery and insurance), it falls 
short on fully explaining the mechanisms behind these truly complex phenomena. There is a lot more 
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happening here than merely the mechanisms behind the weighting function, but this analysis gives us a usable 
tool to understand and model, the process under which, decision makers may come about their decisions.    
To demonstrate this process of the over- or underweighting phenomenon, Robert Schiller [2013] gives 
an example of flight cancelation insurances. He argues, that since there are huge individual differences in the 
attitude towards risk like we have established before. There are, therefore, huge differences in the attitude 
towards to necessity of, in this situation, insurances. This tendency, by a small minority of individuals, to 
highly, in this example, overweight the occurrence of the flight cancellation, is widely known and exploited 
by the flight and insurance companies, Schiller argues. Thus, the flight companies do offer a possibility to pay 
for insurance, to cover the damages, that could manifest themselves, if this specific flight would be cancelled. 
The price of this insurance, is of course, outrageous to any reasonable (rational) individual, and for this reason, 
only this small minority of individuals, who are overweighting the occurrence of the cancellation the most, are 
actually buying this insurance. Schiller jokes, that this is actually ingenious to use this bias into one’s 
advantage. Despite the possible moral dilemmas, this exploitation might bring about, the flight companies are 
profiting hugely from offering this insurance. 
 
3.2.2 The established shape of the weighting function 
 
The initial form of the weighting function was a not fully developed one. Empirical experiments are done, later 
on, have slightly transformed the shape of the 
hypothetical weighting function presented in figure 
4. Today the weighting function is presented in the 
form shown on the right. 
The tendency to overweight the extremely 
high end of probabilities, as well as the extremely 
low end of the spectrum (in case of a lottery or 
insurance) is in the present day formulated like 
shown in figure 3. Therefore, the overweighting of 
small(er) probabilities can be found, surprisingly, 
from even small but still rather notable probabilities, 
like demonstrated in the illustration of this theory on this figure. It is truly surprising, that the underweighting 
of almost certain prospects does take place. This underweighting follows similar reasoning addressed in earlier 
figure 4.  
An interesting side note is presented by Epper [2010], who argues that the decision maker’s 
sociocultural and biological (male vs female) background seems to affect the distortion from the small- and 
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medium-sized probabilities, and can, therefore, influence the weighting function presented by Kahneman. 
Epper’s empirical evidence furthermore provides strong evidence in favor of the phenomenon called the 
weighting function. 
 
3.3 The Interaction: Value function x weighting function 
 
The interaction between the value and weighting function is addressed here, with a description about the 
manner, in which, the π and v are connected and how they formulate the overall value for the prospect at hand. 
Let’s now examine the interaction between the weighting function (π) and the value function (v) through a 
mathematical lense. 
For example, we have a prospect (x, p; y,q), where x and y represent for value and p,q represents the 
probability of the event. In this example, the mathematical formation of this problem would be transferred into 
the prospect theory like this, 
 
V (x, p;  y, q) =  π (p)v(x) +  π (q)v(y) 
 
To open up the mathematical presentation in this equation, prospects value is determined as the decision 
maker’s weighting function (π), as a function of the probability (p,q) at hand and it would be multiplied by the 
decision maker’s value (v), in a relation to the value (x,y). From this equation, we can derive the overall value 
of prospect (V), on to which the final evaluation, in other words, the act of a choice is based on.  
The prospect theory also introduces another equation, in the lines with the theory, addressing on of the 
biases done in the editing phase. To understand why this is done, we have to examine earlier finding from the 
editing phase, namely the process of segregation. This process, in which, the destruction into a riskless part, 
and risky part for certain prospect, occurs. This should be inspected through a different mathematical lens. 
Thus, the following equation, 
 
V (x, p;  y, q)  =  v (y)  +  π (p) [v(x) –  v(y)] 
 
In this equation, the first part v(y) describes the decision maker’s value for the riskless option. On top of 
this, the latter part, (π (p) [v(x) – v(y)]), describes the risky part of the prospect. Let’s now examine the 
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interaction of these through an example: V (500, 20%; 100, 80%) = v(100) + π (20%) [v(500) – v(100)]. This 
formulation follows the editing phases segregation section, for which we established the explanation earlier. 
The essential feature of this equation 2, is that the weighting function affects only the risky choice, in this 
example, the value difference between v(x)-v(y), and not the riskless part. This equation gives us an interesting 
framework from which we can evaluate more broad collection of different prospects. 
 
4. The reference point 
 
The reference point is defined as a base point, onto which further evaluation holds. Even though, the concept 
of the reference point is intuitively easy to follow and can be empirically found from different choices under 
risk. The most eminent critique or flaw of prospect theory revolves around the concept of reference point, 
which comically, acts as a cornerstone of this theory. The problem with the reference point is that it is not 
clear on how to exactly determine the reference point in each situation alone. It was even famously noted by 
Levy [1992]: “The prospect theory is reference-dependent theory without a theory of the reference point”. 
For this reason, we are going to take a closer look into the literature around the concept of reference point 
and how it could be done more easily approachable. In the literature regarding the reference point, there have 
been found several personal biases affecting the decision maker’s understanding of the reference.  
 
3.1 Endowment effect 
 
Richard Thaler, who consequently received his Nobel prize in 2017, worked closely with Kahneman and 
Tversky from 1979 onwards. Thaler was profoundly intrigued about the concept of the reference point, and 
since there was an eminent lack of proper studies about the reference point he heavily participated in this 
explanation process. In Thalers empirical studies [1980], he famously found out a pattern of behavior, what 
was later known as the endowment effect. 
The endowment effect is loosely defined as a tendency of individuals to value items more, by the mere 
fact of owning them. To demonstrate this Thaler used one of this (economics) professor colleague as an 
example. Imagine a wine-loving professor, buying a bottle of wine for 10€. Time goes by and eventually, if 
auctioned, the value of this same vine bottle would be 200€. On special occasion as a way of celebration, this 
bottle is brought in, from the vine cellar to be served. Now, the professor is asked if he would be ready to sell 
the bottle for 200€. He says, most defenitely not. Then the professor is asked to buy an identical bottle of wine 
for 200€. He responses by saying, that only a fool would be ready to spend that much for a single bottle of 
vine. Now Thaler argues, we are witnessing an anomaly known as the endowment effect. The endowment 
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effect is, therefore, described as a phenomenon, in which, people often demand significantly more for giving 
up an object than they would be ready to pay in order to acquire it (the identical object).  
 
4.2 The status quo bias 
 
This story about vine-loving professor also brings into being another anomaly, presented by Zeckhauser 
[1988], called status quo bias. This bias refers to a phenomenon that people tend to value their current state of 
being more than could be seen as reasonable. Both the status quo and the endowment effect are tightly attached 
to the phenomenon presented by prospect theory like loss aversion. On the other hand, however, Tversky 
[1991] points out that there are several cost factors, including costs like the cost of thinking, transaction costs 
and psychological commitment to prior choices. For these reasons, Tversky argues, the status quo bias can 
take place even in the absence of loss aversion.  
On top of this, Plott [2005] brings into the discussion, controversial but still relevant, the point about 
the exchange asymmetries that may also take place for the simple reason that the perceived objects, organically 
received, might be seen as more valuable. Valuable, because they might be seen as, e.g. a gift and therefore 
the exchange of these objects could be seen as impolite. In the famous test, modeling the status quo bias, done 
by Knetsch [1989], he gave a group of Cornell university students randomly either mugs, worth of 6€ or high-
quality chocolate, worth of 6€. According to Coase’s theorem7, without transaction costs, half of the cups 
should be traded. For some reason, this did not occur. In fact, actually surprisingly 89% of those of whom were 
originally given the mug, wanted to keep it, rather than to change it for a chocolate bar. The same phenomenon 
did also occur for the other way, 90% of those, who first received a chocolate bar, wanted to keep the chocolate 
rather than to trade it for a mug. This was an astonishing result and was not taken for granted, for this reason, 
the test has been replicated multiple times, yielding the same kind of results time and time again.  
The endowment effect, status quo bias, and the attempt to portray these accomodities as gifts are 
attempts to rationalize what goes in the mind of the decision maker. Getting a glimpse in to the mind of the 
decision maker, is one of vital importance, in order for the economic models to be transformed in a more 
human-friendly way. Models trying to theoretize and understand this “irrational” behavior is crucially 
important, but on the same token, they are truly difficult to be formed. 
To go back to the question about the reference point. The challenges with the reference point do not 
end here. It should be also noted that decision makers do not posses predefined preferences, therefore, either 
do references points, for every situation beforehand. For this reason, Tverksy [1990] argues, it can be assumed 
 
7 Coases theorem: to put it simply is that when markets have no transaction costs, the participants will negotiate the 
most cost-effective way of distributing the perceived goods in a way that maximizes the value of the production. For 
this to be relevant, it is important to add that property rights must be clearly defined, for the theory to hold. 
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that decision makers decide their preferences in the process of making a choice or judgement. Thus, these 
preferences can be seen to be influenced by the context in which each choice takes place, and also by the 
procedure involved in the decision-making.  
To stir things up, Knetsch [1989] brings to light an observation: “preference orderings are not defined 
independently of endowments: good A may be preferred to B when A is part of an original endowment, but 
the reverse may be true when initial reference positions are changed”. This economically peculiar phenomenon 
could be described more mathematically: indifference curves are accustomed to having a kink at the reference 
point. In this way, the question about reference point dependence arises again.  
More recently Rabin [2006] introduced an attempt to address the challenge of defining the reference 
point, hence gains and losses. Rabin proposed a framework, in which, the reference point is profoundly 
influenced by the decision maker’s expectations about the possible outcomes in this exact moment. Barberis 
[2013] concludes that, in Rabin’s paper, decision makers derive utility from the difference between 
consumption and expected consumption. This is truly alternative to conceptualize the concept of utility. Since 
in this way of contextualizing utility, the utility would not be derived from the act of consumption itself. Even 
though, by itself, it may not be the most accurate or scientifically relevant indicator of one’s derived utility. 
This way of contextualizing might still give us a new framework, by which we can enhance our existing models 
modeling the perception of the process, through which the decision maker’s utility is actually formed. 
 In his analysis, Rabin recognizes this and states that the analysis about the formulation of the decision 
maker’s utility should not only follow this model, in which, but decision makers also derive utility only from 
gains and losses because the more traditional models do offer useful insights. Therefore, Rabin recognizes, 
that diversity in the used models, in portraying the mystical world of the mind of the decision maker, might be 
the key to more enriched theorization success. 
 
4.3 Learning 
 
The most convincing evidence towards the prospect theory can be found in the situations where the problem 
set (prospects) are relatively new for the decision makers. In these novel situations, demonstrated by Kahneman 
[1979, 1990] Thaler [1980], the above-mentioned anomalies do occur. However, when decision makers are 
facing prospects that they are familiar with, the anomalies tend to weaken significantly, and in some cases 
even disappear. List (2003,2004) kindly suggested that the prospect theory may be less useful in describing 
the behavior of experienced decision makers. The list also points out that the data, used in their analysis, 
provides evidence consistent with the notion that throughout time (trial and error) decision makers learn to 
overcome the endowment effect, even in situations beyond the specific problem they have earlier on 
encountered already. 
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 An interesting study about this phenomenon was presented by Knetch 1989, who noted that “if 
decision makers can learn to overcome these anomalies. Then, even if these anomalies would exist, it would 
not be hard to dampen their effect, we simply, just need to teach decision makers about their inadequates and 
this way they will lean to avoid them. However, during his experiments, the extent to which, these anomalies 
occurred, decreased. They, however, remained significant enough that it could not be argued that it would be 
possible just to teach the decision makers out of their biases. 
 In spite, according to List, in the case of the cold professionals, doing, for example, efficient business, 
the decision makers can be taught to avoid these anomalies to a large extent. List’s experiments are consistent 
with the notion that agents can learn to contextualize their endowments as opportunity costs rather than simply 
as a loss. For this reason, even though, the psychological reasons e.g. listed above, might be accurate in 
explaining the anomalies, List’s data here does suggest that the psychological effect can also help to explain 
the attenuation of the anomalies. This is, by itself, a truly different approach in the literature, trying to figure 
out ways, out of the psychologically based anomalies, we are clearly making. 
 
5. Critique towards the prospect theory 
 
5.1 Critique of the methodology 
 
Every piece of relevant scientific literature receives it’s a fair amount of critique, even though it would be 
revolutionary. This is also definitely the case with prospect theory. The most eminent critique or flaw of 
prospect theory revolves around the concept of reference point a critique of which we tried already to tackle.  
The most common critique, that the prospect theory’s methods have received, has to do with the 
conditions under which the empirical (laboratory) part of the initial theory was formed. Early on, it was noted 
that the monetary incentives were too small, to motivate decision maker’s to properly analyze the situation 
and, therefore, the results would not be adequate. This notion was tackled by Shehate (1992), who examined 
and demonstrated the preferences of Chinese students with monetary incentives equaling up to their three 
month’s salary. The same caliber monetary incentives were not possible to offer in the western world since the 
monetary incentives would have been out-of-budget for the science project. Regardless, the evidence clearly 
suggested that Chinese students kept overweighting small probabilities, despite receiving sizeable rewards. 
From this Shahatem concluded, that the overweighting phenomenon can be found from both small and large 
monetary incentive cases. In other words: monetary incentives do not play a significant role in the 
overweighting phenomenon. 
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Suspicions towards the laboratory test’s legitimacy in the original paper [Kahneman 1979] was 
common. These suspicions were various. One common suspicion was presented by many, including Isaac 
[1987], who argued, that the participants of these original tests were not facing a real decision, but rather a 
hypothetical one. The concern being, that when decision makers were faced with this hypothetical decision, 
the subjects would not have adequate incentives to think these complex problems fully rationally through. For 
this reason, subjects would not act in a manner which they would, when faced with a real decision. 
  Plott [1979] took this as a challenge and started to examine these accusations in an article: “A 
series of experiments designed to discredit the psychologists”. In which, he presented a series of experiments 
with proper monetary incentives and other motivators, to take into the account of the notion about real-life 
relevance. Despite their best efforts to tear the theory apart, the vital parts of prospect theory remained intact. 
Later on, Tversky [1992] concluded that “All major violations of expected utility theory were obtained both 
and without monetary incentives”. In other words, Tversky is pointing out how these violations of expected 
utility theory can be interpreted as findings supporting the prospect theory. Despite this, Tversky does 
aknowledge that with sizeable monetary incentives, the degree of which, for example, probability weighting 
occurs, decreases. But the principle is still significant. In Plott’s, an article they were trying their best to 
simulate real-life decision-making scenarios and these experiments were regarded as a reasonable defence in 
favour of the prospect theory. 
 The more inventive critique was presented by Reilly [1982] who was concerned that the studied subject 
might not be fully informed or fully understand the nature of the reasoning or logic behind these experiments. 
For this reason, he conducted experiments in small groups, where the subjects were explained the reasoning 
process behind expected utility and were constantly reminded of this line of reasoning. The subjects also had 
the opportunity to interact with the experimenter. And were in this way as, informed about the monetary 
reasoning behind the expected utility theory, as possible. Despite all of this, the probability weighting and 
other illogical, psychologically created, biases remained. The reactions were occurring on a decreased rate but, 
despite that, they were still significant.  
 Both Plott’s and Reilly’s papers are attempts to discredit the prospect’s theorems notions, by going as 
far as,  formulating the research question in a way that could bring the status-quo (expected utility theory) back 
to the table, as the most accurate explanation for decision-making under risk in real-life and this way discredit 
the notions presented by the prospect theory. Even though their best efforts, scientists have been falling short 
on this attempt. The empirical evidence is amazingly strong in favor of the prospect theory and this has been 
noted time and time again. The most eminent problem with prospect theory is the lack of sufficient theory 
about the reference point and the deficiency related to this lack of reliable theory to once and for all to disclose 
this discussion about the relevance of this topic. On top of this, there have been challenges, that have been 
encountered during attempts to create practical models to be utilized in real-life-situations to correctly model 
human-like behavior. 
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5.2 Problems in the practical implementations 
 
To get back to the critique, thought. More recently, some scientists are, after all this time, trying their best to 
nullify the prospect theory’s notions. For example, Nwogugu [2005] claimed that prospect theory “is in fact 
developed under questionable data”, an interesting critique, but not original one nevertheless. Nwogugu goes 
on stating that the choice process under risk is exceptionally complex. Therefore, it would be impractical to 
propose a simplistic model for decision-making under risk. This example shows, how even after decades of 
scientific literature, the findings can still be argued against. Nowadays, these earlierly proposed objections 
won’t accumulate much of an effect (citations), since the topic is fairly largely debated in the scientific 
literature beforehand. In spite of that, it is useful to bring this ever-going debate into the limelight, in order to 
be discussed for good. 
 Barberis [2013] points out that even though, the major insights from prospect theory would be widely 
accepted, the theory turns out to be truly difficult to be properly adapted in practice, like noted above. Primitive, 
in some ways successful, attempts have been made in the fields of finance and insurance. In other fields, 
however, even after 40 years, the practical models are still yet waiting to be formulated or to be more accurate, 
for themselves to be developed. This is the most prominent path for the prospect theory to develop in the future. 
For this reason, today, this lack of practical insights can be seen as a major downside in the prospect theory.  
To conclude, the critics of prospect theory have mostly tried to find imperfections from the empirical 
experiments done by Kahneman and Tversky. Numerous critical attempts have been presented on the basis of 
the absence of financial incentives, lack of opportunities to learn, by transaction cost and other economic 
variables. A major part of the critique has been properly addressed and the concerns about the relevance in the 
real-life situations have been tackled with the support of strong empirical evidence. However, the strict 
defining of the reference point has not yet been resolved and the proper practical prospect theory models are 
still under their way. These are the Achilles heels of prospect theory, they can still be addressed properly in 
the future.  
However, as mentioned in the introduction, prospect theory is mainly a descriptive model, and for this 
reason, the in-depth insights can be mostly done on the contextual level. In prospect theory these have been 
the notion about the weighting function, demonstrating the unmathematical ways by which decision makers 
do contextualize probabilities. The other one has been the shape of the value function, demonstrating how 
decision makers actually, illogically overweight the subjective value of the losses in contrast to the gains. In 
the next chapter, we will dive into the empirical evidence and practical attempts to utilize the prospect theory. 
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6. Empirical findings and applications 
 
One of the reasons why the prospect theory has held its ground is because of the strong empirical evidence to 
support its claims. This way the prospect theory differs greatly from many of the other models trying to 
explain the decision-making under risk, which does sometimes struggle with the explination for the empirical 
findings. The empirical evidence is in favor of, for example, the endowment effect of the prospect theory, 
especially with everyday consumable goods. Goods, like in the case of earlier illustrated example with mugs 
and chocolate bars. In experiments like these, there is literally no room for the argument, that decision 
makers would not have sufficient information and, therefore, well-structured preferences for the goods used 
in these experiments. Thus, the critique towards the legitimitacy of the experiments does not hold its ground 
in these cases. 
To experiment with more unique objects, List (2003) performed an experiment, in which, he 
examined trading with unusual objects. To obtain this, he conducted the experiment using unique pieces of 
memorabilia. This made it certain, that the decision makers would not have encountered these objects before. 
This laid a groundwork for a great experiment to observe the evolution of the market behavior through out 
time when the decision makers developed more knowledge about the objects traded in the experiment. In this 
experiment, List noticed, that decision makers with more knowledge and experience about the traded objects 
were taking a significantly larger role in the market place. In other words, they traded more than the lesser-
experienced decision makers. Inspired by this, List started to analyze market behaviour in a larger scale. 
List’s (2003, 2004) findings do suggest that prospect theory may be less useful in describing the behaviour of 
experienced economic actors at least in the market place. 
 
6.1 Finance 
 
6.1.1 Implications for financial markets 
 
The central axioms of the prospect theory, namely the weighting function and the value function, have probably 
been taken into account most strongly in the field of finance, since the status quo, in the finance sector is the 
decision-making process under risk. Recently, the evaluation and the studies concentrated on the financial 
markets and have been affected strongly by the prospect theory. This progress, in the analytical models used 
to understand the marketplace, however, is still relatively recent. Thus, it is still heavily under debate and 
evaluation.  
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To shed more light onto the roots of the economical analysis, we should remember the analytical 
framework, from which, the scientist here is trying to find their way out of. Before the prospect theory, markets 
were studied under more narrow models based on Von Neumann-Morgenstern8 expected utility theory, this 
theory is still widely used and the status quo theory, by which, scientists are presenting their models of the 
economical behaviour of the decision makers. In spite of this, the psychological findings, including systematic 
errors (biases) in the way we think, were introduced by Kahneman and Tversky [1979]. The slow acceptance 
process of this reality, have, in fact, been the driving force in creating a new discipline explaining the 
economical behaviour we exhibit, called behavioural finance. In behavioural finance, the inconsistencies about 
the decision makers decision proses are taken more seriously into account. The main idea behind this 
discipline’s economic analysis is not to ignore the huge body of literature and knowledge about human 
behaviour in the field of psychology. But rather, to integrate its valuable lessons into economic analysis. This 
all is done, in an attempt to create more profound economic models to explain the decision makers behaviour.  
Despite this, Ritter [2003] reminds us, that modern financial theory works under the assumption called 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), in which, the assumption is that investors are not rational but due to the 
huge mass off investors, the markets are rational. In this theory (EMH), the competition between investors 
seeking abnormal profits should be driving the prices to their “real” value and for this reason, the abnormal 
profits do vanish. However, in the light of the prospect theory, it is assumed that during some periods of time, 
financial markets are not functioning fully efficiently, in regard to the information available. This axiom about 
the prospect theory and more broadly about the discipline of behavioural finance has been controversial, to say 
the least.  
 
6.1.2 Inconsistencies in the performance of the stocks 
 
Interestingly, Barberis [2008] examined the possibility for overweighting to occur in the financial markets. 
More specifically in this paper, Barberis was interested about the relation of the skewness in the distribution 
of IPO9s and the historical profits followed, if invested in the IPOed stocks compared to a reference group of 
stocks, consisting of mainly similar companies, the difference being that these reference group stocks would 
not have been IPOed. Shokingly, they noticed that just like the prospect theory predicts, the IPOed stocks did 
actually underperform compared to the reference group. This was in contradiction with the expected utility 
theorems predictions. 
 
8 Is a theory about decision making under risk, in which, decision maker’s will behave as if they would be maximizing 
the expected value of a function defined as potential outcomes in a specified point in the future  
9 IPO = Initial Public Offering = The first sale of a company’s shares to the public 
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 Barberis explained these findings by noting that the skewness of the distribution in the IPOed 
companies is actually heavily right leaning. This skewness mainly occurs because the IPOs that do heavily 
succeed, as the IPO’s of Microsoft and Google, bring in phenomenal returns, and, therefore the right tail of the 
distribution is extremely long. The probability (a portion of all the IPOs done), however, for this to happen, is 
extremely low. For this reason, Barberis argues, the investors are actually overweighting the probability of 
this, extreme success. This overweighting happens with the expense of the actual situation, and this helps us 
to explain the fact that the average returns of IPOed are over-valued. With this in mind, Barberis goes on 
stating, like noted in the overweighting of the extremely unlike outcomes, the psychological findings explain 
the over-valuation of the IPOed stocks because the situation when funding an IPO could be parallelized against 
a gamble-like-situation. 
 During the last ten years, the implication the prospect theory puts forward the overweighting, and 
therefore the over-valuation of the IPO’ed stocks, have received huge amounts of empirical support. The first 
piece of criticism that Barberis have received has been the questioning the implication put forward that the 
more positively skewed stocks would have lower average returns. This critique has been tackled by several 
independent studies, including, e.g., a paper by Vorkink [2010], who noticed that using, various techniques to 
measure skewness, the results stayed the same. More positively skewed the stocks have in average lower 
returns on investment. 
An interesting finding was conducted by Hwang (2012), who noticed that when a company have 
IPO’ed, the higher it’s predicted skewness have been, the lower the firms actual average returns have been. 
These findings do go hand in hand with the central axioms of the prospect theory, e.g., the weighting function 
predicts that when the probability of something to happen decreases, the actual over-weighting phenomenon, 
made by decision makers, increases. This is exactly what the empirical evidence suggests, for this reason, these 
relatively new findings, are probably lifting their presence into more lime light. 
 
6.1.3 Experimenting with the boundaries of the limits regarding implications 
 
While most of the times, the new light the prospect theory has brought to the market analysis, sometimes 
academics do go into rather condescending analysis about the markets. For example, Ritter [2003] gives an 
example of how behavioural financial analysis can prove to be rather useful in determining the “right” stock 
prices. He argues, that because of the failure of the accountants to mathematically sufficiently account the 
relation with own and foreign money, the stock markets are likely to be undervalued during high rates of 
inflation and vice versa. 
Even though this example might seem out-of-context, it serves here as an example how on the other 
hand the insights the prospect theory can truly help us to understand the financial market movements (the 
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overweighting taking places in IPOs), it can, on the other hand, pave the way for truly wild interpretations of 
the financial market movements. For this reason, caution is, on the other hand, slowing the adaptation of the 
prospect theory’s central axioms, but at the same time this caution, prevents the science makers to be able to 
form these wild interpretations done in the name of prospect theory or the behavioural economics. 
  
6.2 Insurances 
 
The most logical practical applications for the prospect theory do manifest themselves in the areas of finance, 
as we established already, and in the area of insurance. The decisions regarding insurances are performed in 
the presence of a risky component like they were in the area of finance as well. For this reason, the 
imperfections and biases about the decision process, the decision makers manifest, itself is likely to occur, in 
this instance, in the acquirance of insurances as well. Thus, the prospect theory might have something to offer 
for the research done in the field of insurances, as well. 
 In fact, the prospect theory has been found to be useful in the modern studies about the behaviour the 
decision makers manifest, regarding their insurance policies. For example, Sydnor [2010] conducted a 
throughout analysis about the decision behaviour of 50 000 decision makers, who were deciding about their 
insurances. From this data, Sydnor noticed a behaviour pattern, in which, the decision makers were likely to 
choose an insurance policy, including smaller deductibility rate, even much so, that when compared to similar 
insurance policies with higher rate of deductibility, the decision makers were willing to pay an extra 100$ for 
the reduction of their deductible rate. Therefore, Sydnor argues, in the framework of the expected utility theory, 
this manifested behaviour pattern, can only be rationalized by unreasonably high levels of risk aversion since 
the decision makers are not exposed to irrational behaviour. 
To explain this irrational behaviour, however, Sydnor heavily leans towards the prospect theory, and 
more specifically, the weighting function in the prospect theory, because it offers an explicit explanation for 
the behaviour that Sydnor has exposed in his experiments. Like in the case about the skewness of the 
distribution regarding IPOs and revenues regarding them, the decision makers seem to overweight the 
possibility for extremely unlikely events to occur. Thus, in this instance, the decision makers are willing to pay 
compensation, for the decreased rate of probability, for them to be exposed to the actual damages caused by 
the occurrence of the unwanted event. To go even further into this example, the decision makers seem to place 
more emphasis on the unpleasant outcomes, and they are, for this reason, willing to pay a higher premium for 
the reduction of the deduction, than could be seen reasonable.   
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6.3 Other possible applications for the prospect theory 
 
6.3.1 Case: Cab drives in New York City 
 
The insights of the prospect theory have been utilized in various different practical applications. It has been 
rather difficult, to say the least, but despite that, there have been a few true in-life-cases, outside finance and 
insurance, in which, the axioms of the prospect theory have been truly useful. Thaler [1997] conducted an 
experiment, where he examined the laws of labour supply, in the case of the cab drivers in New York City. 
Before thaler, there had been done a few studies regarding the labour supply but they shared a common problem 
in regard to the problem of estimation. Luckily for Thaler, cab drives do have flexible self-determined working 
hours, with face wages that are highly correlated within days but only weakly correlated within days. Because 
of these underlying facts, the results found from this experiment could be seen as reasonable and credible. 
 The experiment yielded the following interpretations. Firstly, cab drivers (at least inexperienced ones) 
tend to make labour supply decisions (weather to work or not) with “one day at a time” principle, rather than 
deciding their working hours in comparison within the framework of multiple days. On top of that, Thaler 
argued, cab drivers seemed to set loose daily income targets for themselves, and once that goal has been 
achieved, they do stop working on that day. These interesting findings were widely noticed, and the explanation 
for this irrational behaviour was under great debate. This experiment about the laws of labour supply, done 
with the data of New York City’s cab drivers is a phenomenal example of how widely the prospect theory can 
be utilized when used properly. 
 
6.3.2 The possibilities for future applications 
 
Even though prospect theory was published in 1979, it has not been utilized as thoroughly than could be seen 
possible, according to Barberis [2013]. He argues, that the prospect theory had a bumpy start since it took a 
fairly long time before it has even been seen worthy of any attention. Finally, when the prospect theory started 
to gain the publicity needed to push the practical applications forward, problems with defining the reference 
point and several other problems regarding the practical implementations. For these reasons, actually 
achlomplishing these models themselves proved to be truly hard to overcome. Only more easily accessible 
applications in the field of finance and insurance, established their position as a worthy addon, to complement 
the existing models. For this, we went through some examples already. 
 It has been only recently, in this millennium, when prospect theory has been able to offer promising 
models to support the existing ones in various fields. E.g., Finnish scientists Korhonen and Koivuranta noticed 
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a longshot bias in the horse race markets, to explain this they utilized the weighting function and its conclusion 
to help to explain this noticed irrational behaviour. The betting market as a broader field has the potential to 
use these models more broadly. To tackle more of the macro level issues, there could be done made if these 
findings would be used, e.g., in the context of downward rigidity of nominal wages. Here, the concept of loss 
aversion relative to a reference point could bring in some new insights about the dynamic between companies 
and employees, when fighting throughout horrendous times of economic depression. These finding could be 
used more generally in industries, where the business cycles do play more significant roles. Barbeis concludes, 
that to name a few areas where the prospect theory has not been applied extensively, even though, there could 
be seen a huge potential for it, are fields such as health economics and macroeconomics as a whole. All in all, 
it can surely be said, that there is still plenty of potential for the use of prospect theory.  
  
7. Conclusions 
 
To conclude, in this paper we discussed, in great detail, the revolutional axioms presented by Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky in 1979, namely the prospect theory. Prospect theory has forever changed the way we 
conseptualize the decision-making process under risk. The theory itself is divided into two separate phases; 
editing and evaluation phase. The most prominent part of the editing phase is coding, in which, decision makers 
change the meaning of, e.g., monetary sums of money, to more easily approachable form; gains and losses. 
This has been one of the biggest conceptual insights of this theory.  
However, as we established before, to review events in the light of gains and losses, they need to be 
in reference to something. In prospect theory, this was named as a reference point. The problem with coding 
(gains and losses) and the reference point is that, in the real-life applications, it has been unclear what a gain 
or loss represents in any given situation. This challenge remains unsolved. Addressing it is a key-challenge for 
the future of the prospect theory and its real-life applications. 
On top of this, prospect theorems strong suit has been the weighting function, which demonstrates the 
way in which decision makers over and undervalues mathematical probabilities. In figure 2, this is truly 
brilliantly demonstrated. This finding is to a great extent used in the field of, e.g., insurance since the 
uncertainty is an inherent part of the industry. The weighting function does also question the expected utility 
theorems axiom about a rational decision maker, because it shows how, even when decision makers are greatly 
exposed to the true mathematical probability, the anomalies of over and underweighting still occurs. 
Anomalies emerging from the evaluation of a prospect were greatly also noted by the value function. 
In the value function, it was demonstrated through empirical evidence, how decision makers were constantly 
feeling more pain (pleasure), from losing (gaining) an exactly equivalent monetary sum of money. In more 
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conservative models, e.g., the expected utility theorem, this contradiction would be not possible. These 
emerged anomalies were truly hard to fathom within the economists and were, therefore, criticised extensively. 
The experiments were conducted multiple times, each time with more like real-life situations for the decisions 
made under risk. Even though the best efforts, these anomalies stayed. Because of this truly strong empirical 
evidence, the prospect theory is today widely recognized. 
The applications of this the prospect theory have been the most vital in the areas of finance and 
insurance since they are, in essence, concerned with situations involving uncertainty. This is why in these 
fields the prospect theory have naturally had a stronger foothold and also the framework has been adapted to 
the academic reasoning as well. In fact, this theorem has been an inherent part of the formulation in the field 
we today call behavioural economics. One of the first foot steps were made in that direction by Kahneman and 
Tversky and soon after by Thaler.  
 In other fields, the theory itself has proven to be truly difficult to be modelled into a given situation 
at hand. There have been plenty of practical problems, one of which have to do in regard to the definition of 
the reference point. Despite this, during this millennium, successful attempts have been made and, therefore, 
the prospect theory has been more widely utilized. Thus, in the near future, we might be able to model the 
prospect theory to fit a larger range of applications. 
To conclude, the failure to endogenize all of the relevant variables at this stage of the prospect theory 
is a limitation of the theory but not a fatal flaw. Therefore, “we should see it as an opportunity to improve the 
theory rather than as a reason to reject it” (Rat Choice 1997). On top of that, the expected utility theorem is 
based on a normatively pleasing set of axioms, where as the prospect theory is mainly descriptive model, which 
has yielded inexplicable solid empirical evidence supporting this descriptive way of reasoning. When all this 
is taken into account, prospect theory has been a revolutionary descriptive model and even though it faces 
challenges in the real life applications, the potential behind the prospect theory is enormous. 
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